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The Politics of Risk Representation 
 
In Risk Society, Ulrick Beck (1992) draws an alarming picture of the world: a world 
of new and intense risk arising from technological developments.  He describes these 
dangers as global threats to life which none can escape and which, unless changes are 
made, will become increasingly hazardous in the future.  The changes required are 
greater reflexivity and effective public participation in what Beck calls 'the auxiliary 
and alternative governments of techno-economic sub-politics - science and research' 
(Beck, 1992, p. 229).  Beck argues for a politics based on reflexive accommodation 
between two opposing forms of knowledge, those of laboratory based science and 
experienced lay persons, in order to recognise and address dangers. 
 
In the context of these global technical risks Beck predicts the rise of what he calls 
'risk society' in which the key political issue is not the distribution of wealth but of 
risk.  He argues that 'risk society' will be the inevitable outcome of the contradictions 
inherent in modernity due to technological developments, the meeting of basic 
material needs, ideologies of equality and individualism and the loss of faith in 
science.  For Beck the contemporary concern with environmental and health risks 
amongst some sectors of the population in Europe and the United States is a new 
phenomenon which will become generalised throughout society.  Indeed, Beck's work 
itself is an attempt to generalise this preoccupation for the language he selects is 
alarmist, referring to 'irreversible harm' (ibid, p. 23), 'apocalyptic catastrophes' (ibid, 
p. 60) and a future scenario in which society becomes habituated to birth defects (ibid, 
p. 83). 
 
For Beck this preoccupation with environmental and health risks could not be 
expected to occur in what he calls 'scarcity society' because 'the distribution of 
socially produced wealth and related conflicts occupy the foreground so long as 
obvious material need, the 'dictatorship of scarcity', rules the thought and action of the 
people (as today in large parts of the so-called Third World)' (ibid, p. 20).  Beck states 
'On the international scale it is emphatically true that material misery and blindness to 
hazards coincide' (ibid, p. 41, emphasis added).  He resurrects the stereotype that 'for 
these people … chemical factories with their imposing pipes and tanks are symbols of 
success' (ibid, p. 42) and the death threat that they contain 'remains largely invisible' 
(ibid).  However, it is evident that Third World peoples are not uniformly 'blind' to 
environmental and health hazards.  Beck quotes a report in Der Spiegel on a steel and 
chemical town in Brazil where in the favelas corrugated roofs must be replaced each 
year because of acid rain, where locals call the rashes residents develop 'alligator skin' 
and where gas masks are sold in supermarkets.  Der Spiegel indicates that the 
Brazilian military government (which invited polluting industries into Brazil) and the 
industries themselves justify policy and practice in terms of local poverty.  Yet Beck 
makes nothing of either the clear differentials of interest and power within Third 
World countries which this example suggests nor of the obvious awareness of health 
hazards any population buying gas masks in supermarkets would have.  Explanations 
couched in terms of 'blindness to hazards' and industrial buildings being seen as 
'imposing symbols of success' are not just inadequate but an offensive 
misrepresentation of Third World people of exactly the kind (and for the same 
purposes) of which Said (1978) and many others have complained. 
 
For Beck, then, the significant difference between the West and the rest is the 
distribution of resources; having met its own material needs and found an acceptable 
level of distribution, western societies are in a position to focus on the environmental 
and health risks created by technology.  Here we can see that the scale of Beck's work 
is too grand and his statements too sweeping; he generalises from his knowledge of 
Germany since the 1970s, is unreflexive about his own views of the West and the 
Third World and is inevitably caught out by history.  Risk Society, for example, was 
first published in 1986 before the unification of Germany and the subsequent conflicts 
over resources and before the 'welfare experiment' was declared unsustainable in the 
West.  Contrary to Beck, the salience of class position and conflicts over access to 
resources are not declining; rather the situation is becoming more polarised as debates 
on exclusion and the development of gated communities testify.   
 
Illich (1971), Sahlins (1972), and others would consider Beck's view that there is an 
obvious relationship between material goods and the perception of scarcity or poverty 
naïve.  For them the West is the epitome of 'scarcity society' since capitalist society is 
founded on the ethos that one's needs are infinite and never satisfied.  With such an 
ethos the West will never be free of wants, will never overcome conflicts over the 
distribution of wealth and, if the meeting of material needs is the criterion for a focus 
on global hazards, will not be the prime candidate for safeguarding the global 
environment (as America's stance at the 1997 Kyoto Climate Summit testifies).(1) 
 
Nuclear Risk - a Discussion 
 
Despite his passing acknowledgement that the rise of risk society is essentially a rise 
in the perception of technological risk Beck does not maintain a distinction between 
risks as hazards and the perception of risk.  For Beck the epitome of modern 
technological risk is the nuclear threat; here the level of risk is incalculable, 
incompensateable, no one can be held individually responsible and those at risk 
include people not yet conceived.  Even if we agree that nuclear technology poses a 
new hazard to the planet of the order Beck suggests, in the West its perception as such 
is recent and cannot be explained in terms of rising wealth or declining economic 
inequalities.  A quick rummage in my own past as a lay historian of the nuclear threat 
produces a different picture.  In the mid-1960s the first task of each day in my 
American fundamentalist Christian primary school was to memorise three verses of 
the New Testament so that when (not if) 'the Russians' (read Communists) invaded 
and burnt all the Bibles we, the pupils of Los Angeles' Golden West School, could 
reconstruct an underground Bible.  During this period sirens would sound across the 
city at which the class would 'duck and cover', as required by America's policy of 
national readiness for Russian nuclear bombs.  In our case we would duck under the 
desks, hands protecting our necks against falling glass, and await the nuclear bombs. 
 A decade later I was in England on a college trip being shown around Brighton police 
station. We were shown a bunker equipped with radio equipment, a few months' food 
and water stores and a shooting range.  We heard of the arrangements for police 
personnel who had volunteered to leave their families for the bunker should Britain be 
attacked by Russian nuclear bombs.  When leaving, gun mountings on the station's 
roof were pointed out to us.  The guns were to hold back crowds clamouring to enter 
the bunker once nuclear war was declared.  The police (and state?) were confident 
that after a few months it would be safe to resurface.  A decade further on and I took a 
break from fieldwork in 1989 in a rundown South Indian beach resort, only to marvel 
at history's prank that, in the space of a few years, locates one-time arch enemies, in 
this case the passengers of two cruise ships, one Russian, one American, on the dance 
floor of a leading non-aligned country.  By this time the nuclear threat was perceived 
as an environmental risk which for some none would survive but for others would be 
more in the order of John Wyndham's post-Apocalyptic vision depicted in The 
Chrysalids.  A 1987 survey of public attitudes in Britain reflects these shifts in 
attitude to nuclear weapons.  It found that 82% of people thought they would not 
survive a nuclear war between the superpowers while a quarter of those over 54 years 
old either thought they would or were not sure whether they would survive (Jones and 
Rees, 1990 p. 58).  
 
What I am arguing is that Beck is missing the point; even the perception of the most 
modern and devastating of technological hazards is, as Monica Hunter-Wilson (1951) 
said about the content of witchcraft beliefs in relation to small-scale societies, the 
expression of society's nightmare.  From the 1950s to the mid-1980s the communist 
threat was the West's central nightmare.  Nuclear weapons, which for much of the 
time were not popularly thought of as qualitatively different from conventional 
bombs, were a vital deterrent.  While nuclear weapons are now recognised as 
qualitatively different it is instructive to note that opposition to nuclear stockpiles 
dissipated once communist regimes collapsed in the USSR and Eastern Europe 
despite the continuing development, upgrading and deployment of nuclear arms.(2) 
 
Clearly, then, the West cannot be described as having an 'objective' view of 
environmental hazards.  Instead, at the end of the century, the West is undergoing 
millennial angst: uncertain about social and economic relations nationally and 
internationally as power becomes less localised, technological risk becomes the stand-
in for distant, unaccountable, often unidentifiable, shifting 'centres' of power.  In this 
context Dolly the cloned sheep, Chernobyl, Creutzfeld Jakob's Disease and 
Thalidomide are metaphors for society's nightmare.  It is not the West's comparative 
wealth that underlies the contemporary concern with technological risk amongst 
certain sectors of the population, rather it is its impotence.  Having failed to realise the 
most recent incarnation of the 'white man's burden', global development, and unsure 
of their own social and economic future certain sections of the West's population now 
aspire to save the world from man-made risk. 
 
Risk and Blame 
 
Following Mary Douglas (1992), I am arguing that risk-talk itself is political; it 
attributes blame by asserting moral positions and legitimates formal and informal 
disciplinary regimes.  Thus risk-talk is best viewed as pointing to the fears and ethos 
of society as well as the distribution and sources of power within society.  Risk-talk 
needs to be contextualised and studied in fine detail, however, as Beck drew a 
distinction between the West and Third World countries I briefly compare Britain and 
India before turning to a consideration of the risk-talk prevalent in India and the low-
income settlements of Chennai, formerly called Madras.  A comparison of Britain and 
India at the end of the twentieth century does not reveal clear-cut economic and 
technological differences for India is highly industrialised, poses a threat to Britain's 
service sector, has nuclear power stations and nuclear arms, and, unlike Britain, has 
an independent capability to build and launch satellites.  Awareness and protest 
against environmental and health hazards are equally sectoral, sporadic and 
inconsistent in Britain and India.  Greenham Common is matched by opposition to the 
Narmada Dams Project in taking on hugely powerful forces.  The long-standing 
Chipko movement's embracing of trees takes on, by similar methods, national and 
business interests as does the much younger anti-roads campaign in Britain.  
Similarly, workers' opposition to risk reductions that threaten their livelihoods is 
common to both countries. 
 
The more obvious difference between the two countries is the way social risks, that is 
risks to one's social status, are increasingly reduced in Britain, providing more 
opportunity for individual choice and self-determination.  Stigmas which attached to 
illegitimacy, divorce, co-habitation, unwed or lone mothers and sex-outside-marriage 
at the beginning of the twentieth century have by the end of the century reduced to 
such an extent that these statuses and activities are increasingly positive choices rather 
than the imposition of others or of circumstance.  Part of this shift is related to welfare 
provision and better employment opportunities for women.  Part is due to the shift in 
popular discourse from that of inherited personalities, which reflect on other family 
members, to personalities molded by individual experience.  Although periodically 
lone mothers and broken families are singled out for blame by government this 
frequently backfires; it is refugees and migrants who are more commonly cited as the 
major source of social and economic ills. 
 
For the majority of the population in India, on the other hand, divorce, desertion, co-
habitation, unwed or lone mothers and sex-outside-marriage are rarely positive 
choices and illegitimacy is strongly stigmatised.  The inadequacy of welfare provision 
and of female wages makes female-headed households an undesirable option.  
Additionally, socially unsanctioned behaviour implicates the whole family, on the 
basis of ideas about common substance (Inden and Nicholas, 1977; Daniel, 1987), 
poor training or the condoning of a selfish disregard for social values.  Although 
recently the most highly charged risk-talk attributes risk and blame to communal and 
caste divisions, the every-day risk on which contemporary Indian society is predicated 
is the threat posed by women to the social order.  Like the West's predilection towards 
affirming itself through stereotypes of other nations, India frequently resorts to the 
spectre of western liberalism which it blames for increases in illegitimacy, broken 
families, destitute women and the abandonment of the elderly in the West.  Thus what 
constitutes risk and the attribution of blame is a social and political phenomenon 
which cannot be read off from economic development. 
 
To support my argument that in contemporary India women are presented as the chief 
risk to the social order I briefly examine discourses on female sexuality and gender 
relations as revealed in the framing and interpreting of national legislation and in 
Tamil ethnic politics.  Despite the view that women are a major risk to society, in 
practice the meaning and implications of the concepts of risk and the associated 
notions of danger, courage, and boldness are context-dependent and contested.  This 
is illustrated by a discussion of the strategies that women employ in Chennai's low-
income settlements to evade these discourses without appearing to contravene them. 
 
Gender and Risk in India 
 
In the popular Indian imagination women are characterised both negatively and 
positively.  These characterisations inform legal and political discourse, media 
representations, popular theatre and ritual as well as every-day interaction.  Positive 
images stress motherhood, purity, chastity, modesty, forbearance, obedience and 
shakti (a power common to gods and women).  The `good woman' is hard working, 
thrifty and restrained; she subordinates her needs to those of her family.  Negative 
images present women as gullible, immodest, promiscuous, cunning, undisciplined, 
lazy, spendthrift and disloyal.  Such women are portrayed as a danger to their 
husbands, their families and society for they drain the family's resources, spoil 
reputations and set individuals and families against each other.  It is acknowledged 
that conforming to social roles requires the suppression of individual short-term 
desires for the longer term, more satisfying goals rooted in family welfare. This 
suppression is considered difficult and, left to their own devices, men, women and 
children will readily 'take the wrong path'.  As Daniel puts it, '[E]vil and decadence 
are taken to be the normal and the expected, whereas goodness and virtue call for 
great effort to create and sustain' (1987, p. 203). 
 
The main mechanism for suppressing men's short term desires is their concern for 
their own as well as their family's reputation.  A key measure of masculinity is a 
man's efficacy in providing for and controlling his wife and children, that is 'keeping 
them on the right path'.  However, it is not enough that a man fulfils his 
responsibilities; for his self-esteem and reputation he must be seen to fulfill them. It is 
thought that if men's efforts at family maintenance, their sense of responsibility and 
masculinity are undermined they will have no incentive to conform to social values. 
Thus social order is at risk when men do not adequately maintain the family and its 
boundaries. Yet their ability to do such is considered easily undermined by women 
who are in a position to dissipate family resources, fail to care for or instruct children, 
have extra-marital relations and disclose family secrets.  Therefore, women (and 
children) must be controlled by husbands and fathers with the aid of society and the 
state. The maintenance of social order requires that women submit to their roles as 
dependent, chaste discreet wives, instructive mothers and reliable stewards in their 
husband's home.  Women's submission to these roles is required not just to control 
women but to control men.  Indeed, men and women strategically utilise these 
discourses to control each other and, in the case of women, to expand their own 
sphere of action. 
 
While the risks and control of female sexuality has a long history in India there has 
been considerable variation in what is deemed to be unacceptable.  This began to 
change in the nineteenth century when missionaries, colonial administrators and 
European travel writers denigrated what they saw as the degraded status of Hindu 
women, the incorporation of lust within marriage through polygamy and multiple 
unions and the barbaric practices of child marriage, female infanticide, widow 
immolation and temple dancers (whom they saw as prostitutes) as well as what they 
considered obscene entertainments enjoyed throughout the social hierarchy (Nair, 
1996; Banerjee, 1989).  The emerging Indian intelligentsia's response was largely to 
admit the colonial critique of contemporaneous practices while denying they 
represented authentic ancient Hindu culture.  Following European Orientalist scholars 
the intelligentsia examined ancient Sanskrit texts to uncover India's glorious past, 
pointing to the education of women and female chastity in the Vedic period 
(Chakravati, 1989). 
 
Confrontation over defining and evaluating Hindu culture sharpened with the colonial 
assessment that barbaric practices made India unfit for self-government (ibid).  
Nationalists, who became increasingly involved in local and national government, 
moved to eradicate those practices considered inconsistent with a civilised society.  
They did this by undermining their material basis, by defining them as obscene and, 
frequently, their practitioners as prostitutes (Nair, 1996; Banerjee, 1989). In the 
process of regulating gender relations and introducing a prudish social attitude, 
prominent nationalists, who were overwhelmingly men, attempted to define women as 
naturally chaste and men as naturally promiscuous (Nair, 1996).  This definition was 
challenged by female nationalists who argued that chastity was a national trait to 
which men must also conform (ibid).(3) 
 
Recourse to ancient texts in order to fight contemporaneous political struggles is not 
confined to the colonial encounter.  It is also common to the politics of the south 
Indian state of Tamil Nadu of which Chennai is the capital.  The Tamil ethnic 
movement, known as the Dravidian movement, claimed to have a superior and more 
ancient language and culture than that of the Aryan-Brahminic culture of north India 
(Dirks, 1996).  It promoted an ethnic identity which rejected Brahminic claims to 
cultural and ritual supremacy and opposed the dominance of north Indians and Hindi 
in colonial and post-colonial India.  Once again morality, particularly the sexuality of 
women, became the yardstick by which one people, in this case the Tamils, claimed 
superiority over another culture, that of the Aryan-Brahminic culture of north India.  
 
Tamil identity is founded on concepts and metaphors of female chastity (karpu) and 
motherhood (Lakshmi, 1990, Ramaswamy, 1992).  It emphasises the centrality of 
motherhood and purity for women and the role of men as heroic protectors of both 
their mothers and all that is termed 'mother' - mother Tamil, mother country, mother 
community (tai kulam).  Female purity and chastity is seen as having a spiritual power 
that demands justice and ensures victory and therefore is the object of veneration.  
Chaste mothers who are themselves descended from chaste mothers produce valorous 
men.  Their wombs are described as the lairs of tigers and this imagery of the 
courageous Tamil son can be seen in classical Sangam poetry (100BC-250AD) (Hart 
III, 1973, p.240), twentieth century politics and the widely popular Tamil film 
industry (Lakshmi, 1995).  A mother who is humiliated, insulted or violated sends her 
sons to do battle on her behalf (Lakshmi, 1990).  Unchaste mothers, on the other 
hand, do not produce valorous sons nor can they lend the spiritual power of their 
chastity to ensure the success of their sons' efforts.  Thus unchaste women are traitors 
to the culture and unrealised persons while the man who does not protect the mother 
and all that is termed mother is emasculated (ibid).   
 
Thus Tamil ethnic discourse evaluates women in terms of their purity and chastity and 
locates them in a domestic, reproductive role, whereas a man's role is a public one 
which requires the overcoming of outside forces to protect and avenge the mother.  
The discourse does not provide men with an independent source of valour and success 
but predicates it on their mothers' purity and, by extension, the purity of all Tamil 
womanhood (the tai kulam).   
 
In India discourses on female sexuality have been a critical tool for shaping, justifying 
and contesting social hierarchies at least since the nineteenth century.  In post-colonial 
India it is one of the main (and public) means by which those of a higher caste and 
class justify their position in the social order.  It is also central to the contestation of 
the social order by those lower down the hierarchy.  While the politicisation of the 
sexual abuse of poor and low caste women by police, employers, landlords and others 
constitutes a challenge to their claim to moral superiority, cynicism towards claims of 
moral superiority by higher class and caste women is widespread.(4)  Similarly, while 
women agree that external controls are necessary to ensure women's  conformity to 
their social roles they deny that men alone have a sense of responsibility for the 
family or concern for the family's reputation.  They claim these dispositions are more 
frequently the preserve of women for not only do they not indulge in the resource-
dissipating and reputation-endangering practices to which men are prone (alcohol 
consumption, extra-marital relations and bigamy) but, unlike men, their resolve to 
forego short term individual desires does not break when their spouses fail to conform 
to social norms.  
 
The view that women are a major threat to a peaceful and ordered society is clear 
from an analysis of national legislation and case law.  The ghoul stalking this body of 
discourse is the sexually autonomous woman.  Despite rhetoric to the contrary, 
legislators have stepped back from supporting women's economic rights in order to 
inhibit female sexual autonomy.  Instead legislation frames women as properly 
located in the domestic sphere and dependent on men.  Hence, the Minimum Wages 
Act (1948) ensured that women receive only two-thirds of what men receive for the 
same work.  The much-vaunted Hindu Succession Act (1956) did little for women's 
right to inheritance or control of what they inherit (Agarwal, 1998).  It was feared that 
should women have equal rights to inheritance they would refuse to marry.  The Code 
of Criminal Procedure specifically predicates women's and girls' right to maintenance 
on their not taking control of their sexuality.  Under the Code a woman's claim to her 
natal or marital family's resources only holds while she surrenders control of her 
sexuality to her father or husband.  A woman has a right to maintenance even after 
divorce provided she has not refused to live with her husband without 'sufficient' 
cause (which does not include adultery), has not agreed to a separation, is not leading 
an 'immoral life' and has not remarried.  Legally maintenance for Muslim women 
should come from their natal families.  The reason for stipulating who is responsible 
for maintaining women is the fear that a woman without economic support will resort 
to prostitution which itself is considered a risk to the family and, hence, the social 
order.    
 
In addition to inhibiting women's sexual autonomy through economic means the legal 
system defines women as the sexual property of men. The Law of Torts provides for 
the wrongs considered deserving of compensation by the judiciary.  It allows for a 
father to sue the person who seduces his daughter and for a husband to sue the person 
who deprives him of his wife's affection and society.  Similarly the Indian Penal Code 
punishes a man who has sexual relations with a woman without her husband's consent 
and provides for the husband to register an official complaint against his adulterous 
wife.  The Penal Code, however, expressly precludes a woman from registering an 
official complaint against her adulterous husband.  The legal system is, as the 
Supreme Court held in relation to Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code, 'intended to 
protect the rights of the husband and not those of the wife' (quoted in Swaminathan, 
1989, p. 134). 
 
Consequently, Swaminathan has argued that 
 
... rape, kidnapping and seduction have been made offences not to protect the person 
of the woman but to protect the rights of a man against violation by another man 
(Swaminathan, 1989, p. 134). 
 
What we see here is that discourses on female sexuality and gender relations which 
took hold in the nineteenth century have continued to dominate legislation in the 
twentieth century.  Not only does legal discourse depict women and girls as the 
property of men and as properly dependent on them but legislation specifically 
hinders women's economic independence.  In basing women's claims to their family's 
economic resources in the transfer of their sexuality to men it defines the sexually 
autonomous woman as losing her rights and status - as having cut herself off from the 
family.   
 
Thus legal discourse and the discourses utilised by those engaged in culturally-framed 
politics define the proper ordering of social relations between men and women and 
the ordering of society itself as rooted in female chastity, achievable only through 
men's control of women.  After nearly two centuries it is commonplace to regard 
unfettered female sexuality as productive of the kind of society of which nightmares 
are made.    
 
It would be a mistake to understand this simply in terms of patriarchal hegemony for 
two reasons.  First, by putting men in charge of women, society (quite consciously) 
attempts to control men.(5)  Second, as Raheja and Gold (1994) argue, it is important 
to recognise that this discourse is not the only discourse on female sexuality and 
gender relations.  Rather it is the most powerful discourse underlying generalised 
conceptions of women and social relations and, therefore, one with which women 
must be seen to conform.  While this discourse is difficult to contest when applied to 
the generality, women can and frequently do contest it when specifically applied to 
themselves (as will be seen below).  Nor should it be understood that subscribing to 
the dominant discourse prevents women from having a more positive view of female 
sexuality and a more playful attitude to sex expressed through song (ibid), or from 
engaging in flirtations (Osella and Osella, 1998) or sexual joking between women of 
equal status.   
 
Women and Risk in the Low-Income Settlements of Chennai 
 
Discourses at both a national level and regional level position women and their 
sexuality as the major risk to society as well as their family's social standing.  They 
present women as properly confined to the dependent, private, reproductive sphere 
while the independent, public, productive sphere is reserved for men.  The residents of 
the two low-income settlements I studied in Chennai between 1990 and 1992 
subscribed to these discourses.  The normal role for women is vitle, literally 'in the 
house', but is also used for 'in the family'. Women are presented and present 
themselves as naturally afraid, shy and ashamed to enter the public sphere: afraid to 
go out of the house, out of the family. Some describe themselves as ignorant, as not 
aware of what happens outside the home, as not knowing how to go about things or 
how to speak to people.  Women are described as easily deceived: fooled by soft 
words, easily persuaded to give or loan money, easily overcharged.  However, in 
response to family need men and women say that the latter are forced to overcome 
their inhibitions and inadequacies: for the sake of their families they must enter the 
public sphere as men do, with the courage (thaiyaram) to face the inevitable risks 
(tunivu) and difficulties (kastham).  This is the discourse that enables women to move 
outside their accepted sphere of activity without posing a risk to their reputations; it 
allows them to expand their sphere of action by defining it as self-sacrifice.  There is 
also a negative discourse: women who unnecessarily enter the labour market are 
selfishly bold/brazen (they have timir) for in flouting social mores they risk their 
family's social standing merely to fulfil individual desires (aasai), frequently assumed 
to be sexual desires.   
 
Examining the key Tamil words used to refer to risk and risk-taking, we find, as in 
English, both a positive and negative view.  Tunivu, in a positive sense, means not 
only the courage and confidence to take risks but that this risk-taking is based on 
sound knowledge.  In practice thaiyaram, meaning courage and confidence, and 
tunivu are used interchangeably to convey this positive view of risk.  Tunivu can also 
refer to risk-taking rooted in foolish stubbornness, temerity, audacity and, when used 
in relation to women, in insolence, immodesty and lack of sexual reticence.  Mosham 
also carries the meaning of risk, but here the risk is one of treachery and deceit, of 
being exposed to danger, of taking the immoral path in life.  Abayam refers to 
unforeseen danger or evil, accidents and deceptions.  Tuni, the root common to the 
word for risk and the verbs to sunder, cut and sever or to be sundered, cut and severed 
points exactly to the consequences of not conforming to dominant values - the risk of 
being repudiated by family, friends, neighbours and caste.   
 
If we look at the way these meanings are attributed to the sexes we find that women 
are seen as more of a risk to themselves, their family, caste and society than are men 
(see Table 1).   
 
(insert Table 1 : Attribution of risk and blame and its consequences) 
 
We can see from Table 1 that women outside the family are also considered a source 
of risk for they may lead men to neglect their responsibilities to their families, if not 
to desertion. Older women or women who have had previous sexual partners are not 
considered sexually attractive so their ability to draw men is attributed to the use of 
witchcraft.  Girls and young women are considered easily misled by men's soft words.  
They are also particularly susceptible to supernatural forces which will lead them to 
reject their prescribed social roles by refusing to get married or to have sexual 
relations with their husbands (Nabokov, 1997), both of which pose risks to the future 
wellbeing of the women concerned and to their family's reputation.  To maintain their 
social standing families are expected to distance themselves from those who flout 
social values.  In practice, women are more likely to be cut off than men and this is 
more likely to be a permanent break than it is for men.  The economic and social 
constraints under which women live make it less feasible for women to dissociate 
themselves from those of whom they disapprove unless they do it in concert with the 
rest of the family. 
 
Thus the discourse on women and risk as well as the attribution of blame prevalent in 
Chennai's low-income settlements is contradictory.  The dominant theme is in keeping 
with the representation of female sexuality in legal and ethnic discourse as the major 
risk to society.  The contingent theme based on necessity, reluctance and self-sacrifice 
potentially provides women with the means to escape their vitle condition without 
endangering their family's reputation.  
       
Negotiating Risk 
 
While all Indian women must negotiate their way round dominant discourses on the 
risks of female sexuality and unconventional gender relations, the economic 
constraints under which poor women live inevitably drive them into direct 
confrontation with these discourses at some point in their lives.  The women in the 
squatter settlement and municipal tenements studied were usually forced into working 
because their husband's incomes were insufficient or too irregular to meet household 
needs.  This insufficiency and irregularity might be due to ill-health or old age but for 
many it was due to high levels of alcohol consumption. In other instances women 
worked because they were deserted or widowed or because their husbands could not 
afford to maintain the women and children of more than one union.  Some women 
worked, not because their family was short of money but because their husbands 
refused to provide enough for the household budget.  In these circumstances women 
must negotiate the values and categories on which the discourses discussed above are 
based; they must find some means of appearing to conform to dominant discourses 
while not doing so.       
 
Before getting to this stage women try to goad their husbands into fulfilling their role 
as provider and protector.   Threatening to take up work is one means.  Another rather 
risky strategy is for a wife to claim to her husband that his reputation as a drunkard is 
encouraging even his own relatives to proposition her.  The efficacy of these 
strategies tends to be short-lived but they do reveal that women utilise dominant 
discourses to make men live up to their prescribed gender role - to take responsibility 
for the family.  At a later stage in the career of a drunkard dominant social values and 
gender stereotypes are turned against a woman.(6) Finding they can neither secure 
work nor loans men with serious drink problems force their wives to hand over money 
for alcohol.  A man can do this in two ways: first, by saying that he is in too much 
pain to eat and if he was sick wouldn't she give him money for medicine and the 
second is by shouting abuse at her from the street or complaining about her to 
neighbouring families.  Thus, in addition to playing on a wife's fear for her husband's 
health, men exploit women's concern for their family's social reputation (maanam).   
We can see here that while the dominant discourse ascribes the sense of family 
responsibility to men rather than to women a number of men are not only willing to 
pursue individual desires at the family's expense but recognise and exploit women's 
sense of responsibility for the family.   
 
The decision to take up work is not lightly entered into even by women running 
households on very tight budgets.   The main reason for their reluctance is that 
working poses a risk to women's reputation for chastity.   In addition, they feel ill-
prepared and powerless in their encounters with strangers.  Initially the change of 
status from vitle woman to working woman feels humiliating and women are unsure 
of how they will be treated by strangers as well as how to respond to them.  However, 
there is no lasting humiliation as long as women can convince others of the validity of 
their objectives.  The necessity of convincing others that a woman only works to 
provide for her family, that she does it with great reluctance, is essential to protecting 
her reputation as a chaste woman.  If, at any point in her working life, she fails to 
convince others they will interpret her actions as located solely in her desire for a jolly 
time.(7)  This marks her as sexually unrestrained, brazen (having timir) and on the 
way to infidelity, if not already unfaithful.   
 
Such a reputation not only shames the whole family, leaving them exposed to 
harassment and disrespect, but can have significant material consequences.  Most 
commonly it decreases the likelihood of finding suitable spouses for sons and 
daughters.  Being asked to leave private rented accommodation and having her 
business boycotted (unless she is a money lender on whom others depend) are not 
uncommon.  Similar consequences affect the families of men with serious alcohol 
problems but because such families are widespread the consequences are less severe.  
It does mean, however, that families containing serious drinkers get trapped in a 
drinking network for, as one woman put it to me, 'Who but a drunkard would rent to 
another drunkard?' and only the families of drinkers will knowingly marry into a 
similar family. 
 
The reluctance with which women enter the labour force can be seen from 
Shantamma's account.  Shantamma is a thirty-eight year old woman of the Vanniar 
caste.  As her own account of being forced to confront dominant discourses 
graphically sets out the dilemmas, experiences and strategies of most of the women in 
the settlements studied, I will recount it in full.  In response to my asking why she 
started working Shantamma said: 
 
Seventeen years ago my husband worked in a private company but lost his job when 
he got asthma.  He didn't work for over two years.  During this time my in-laws didn't 
respect me.  I could see it from the way they looked at me and spoke to me.  They 
thought I only visited them for money and they wouldn't speak to my children.  I 
didn't work at this time because I was worried what people would say.  I was worried 
they wouldn't accept me.  For two years I worried and but I thought I wouldn't be 
doing a cheap job but doing an idly business [making steamed rice cakes] at home.  
But even this felt very demeaning.  I told myself at least it's not stealing.  My husband 
told me not to do the idly business.  He said I knew nothing about it so I shouldn't do 
it.  I persuaded him that it is the same as cooking for the family and that I could make 
a profit from it.  As it didn't cost much to start the business he let me do it. 
 
(How long have you been selling idlies?) 
 
For fifteen years now.  I've redeemed some of my pawned jewels, put my children 
through school and am paying off a loan for my daughter's marriage.  I can pay for 
anything the family needs through the idly business although I'm not making as much 
profit as I was before because the prices [for raw materials] have gone up.   
 
(So it's made quite a difference for you?) 
 
Yes. Earning money has given me a lot of confidence (thaiyaram) too.  When I was 
married I never went out of the house for the first five or six years until my husband's 
elder brother's wife started taking me out.  Even fifteen years ago I only went out to 
buy food locally.  I  didn't have the courage (thaiyaram) to go beyond the local area 
and I wouldn't speak to anybody who came to the house if my husband wasn't at 
home.  I told them to come back later.  Now I have the courage (thaiyaram) to cross 
town to go to the sangham [a women's organisation lending money to the poor] to get 
my loan and if people come to the house I have the courage (thaiyaram) to ask them 
who they are and what they want.   
 
(Are things different at home?  Do you take more decisions, for instance?) 
 
No, it's just the same.  I don't do anything against his wishes.  I have to get his 
agreement. 
 
(How does your family feel about you working?) 
  
After coming up in life and educating my children my brothers respected me because 
they didn't educate their children and I managed it even though my husband was often 
out of work.  Actually they showed me respect  throughout.  Even so I didn't go much 
to see them because people don't respect those who have no money.  They didn't feel 
bad because I was working.  They supported me.  They said "You are only working at 
home and trying to improve your family". 
 
Although not explicitly referring to dominant discourses on the risks of female 
sexuality and unconventional gender relations, Shantamma's account is framed 
against the expectation that everyone subscribes to them.  Embedded in her account 
lie many of the strategies women use to appear to conform to the spirit of these 
dominant discourses while not entirely adhering to them in practice.  Shantamma 
takes great pains to ensure I can have no doubt that she was forced into work for the 
sake of her family, that it does not reflect her own desires and that she has no 
underlying sexual agenda.  The key points are that: she wrestled with her dilemma for 
a long time, she had a real need to work as they had sold or pawned their assets and 
they were not being adequately helped by others (in this case her husband's family).  
In addition, their maanam was going because their need for assistance made them 
unwelcome guests and their poverty was effectively cutting them off from their 
relatives.   
 
Furthermore Shantamma stresses the propriety of her work by emphasising that it is 
undertaken at home, that she has her husband's consent and her brothers' approval, 
and that she continues to submit to her husband's wishes.  The latter reflects one of the 
key objections to women working, that if women earn independent incomes they will 
become arrogant and disobey their husbands.  Should a woman be defined as such her 
husband's reputation for having the upper hand in the family (on which his 
masculinity is based) and her reputation for submitting to the control of her sexuality 
are at risk.  This is also why Shantamma emphasises the necessity for her continuing 
to work by stressing the commonly accepted goals of educating children, securing 
good marriages and redeeming family assets.  It would be unacceptable to suggest her 
objective is to enrich the family because such entrepreneurial activity is only 




Thus in confronting dominant discourses on the risks of female sexuality and 
unconventional gender relations women living on low-incomes strive to dissociate 
themselves from negative traits often attributed to men and considered yet more 
immoral in women.  They do so to avoid definitions of themselves and their 
motivations that would risk their exposure to the material sanctions and loss of 
maanam discussed above.  In doing so women are playing off one risk against 
another.   
 
While I have emphasised the risks women face in relation to their reputations outside 
the family the same concern for maanam poses risks to women and men which can 
create conflict within the family.  Working women pose a risk to men's reputation as 
provider and one-who-is-not-cuckolded and hence to men's self-esteem.  In this 
context men have four options: first, to shape definitions of themselves and their 
relationship by defining their wife's economic contribution as unremarkable and by 
setting constraints on her behaviour and activities, second by refusing to permit their 
wife to work and, should she not submit to this, by reducing or withdrawing financial 
support to the family or by taking the final option of rejecting her altogether.  Thus in 
relation to the extra-household sphere women play off the material and social risks of 
poverty against the material and social risks of working, while in the domestic sphere 
the primary risk with which they juggle is the potential loss or reduction of their 
husband's contribution to the household budget.   
 
This risk is exacerbated where a woman has herself chosen her husband or partner 
rather than submitting to a marriage arranged by her family.  Such a woman is 
considered to have succumbed to lust and put the welfare of her family, including her 
siblings' and (future) children's marriage prospects at risk.  As lust is considered to be 
short lived men engaged in such relationships feel more insecure about their wife 
working than do men in arranged marriages for she has already proven herself to be 
disloyal and sexually motivated.  Consequently, they are far more likely to employ 
stratagems such as turning to drink, chasing other women, denying paternity of their 
children (thereby denying responsibility for their financial support) or threatening to 
leave in order to force their wives not to work or only to work with them.  Thus men 
in love marriages are also playing off risks: in this case the risks to their maanam of 
having their reputedly sexually uncontrolled wife working as against the loss of 
maanam their own stratagems may engender.   
 
All women driven initially by the need to raise family incomes but whose overall goal 
is family welfare risk not only the reduction of their husband's contribution to the 
household budget but also lowered social status (which itself can have economic 
implications) and, in more extreme cases, homelessness and the sexual harassment to 
which lone women are subjected.  Women without the co-operation of their husbands, 
fathers, brothers or, in the case of widowed or deserted women, adult sons are more 
likely to find these risks realised than do those with their support.  
 
Underlying the risks women balance, then, is the dominance of discourses which posit 
female sexuality as a major risk to family and society.  In this context women attempt 
to redefine their transgression of conventional gender roles by arguing that though 
they may be acting and interacting in ways similar to men they do so through the roles 
incumbent on them as women.  That is, they are claiming the positive traits attributed 
to men of courage, confidence, ability and a sense of family responsibility.  As 
Shantamma shows us, this is a source of great pride for women for they have gone 
beyond the timidity stereotypically attributed to them and faced the world with 
courage, confidence and ability.  Whether we should see this as a real change brought 
about by working or merely a good front for assertiveness (though not for what is 
deemed disrespectful or arrogant) is not clear. Shantamma's story is typical of the 
experiences and strategies of women in the two low-income settlements studied in 
Chennai.  Although by no means do all women work from home, all select and justify 
the work they do, the number of hours they put in and its location (all of which 
heavily determine income levels) as appropriate to a balance between their age and 
family's need (Vera-Sanso, 1995).  At the time Shantamma started working she was 
only twenty-three and working from home was the appropriate setting; working in the 
street (with the associated risk of sexual encounters) would not have been. 
 
Although dominant discourses on 'proper' gender relations and the risks of female 
sexuality form the sub-text of Shantamma's representations of herself and her 
motivations this does not mean that she or the other women living on low incomes 
accept these ideas any more than do women elsewhere in India.  Shantamma does not 
think of herself as a risk to her family or society but this is the discursive context in 
which she must operate, a context which has real material effects.   
 
Thus risk-talk is political and has been used to constrain women's economic and 
social position in India since the nineteenth century.  Equally it has been used by 
Indian women for individual and larger political objectives although it rarely works as 
effectively for them as it does against them.  This is because the economic, jural and 
discursive empowering of men in order to control women frequently enables the 
former to side-step women's strategies.  This empowering, which is intended to 
control men by giving them responsibility for and power over women and children, in 
practice enables men to flout social norms more openly than can women.      
 
Conclusion 
My main contention is that Beck does not question why some things or people 
become defined as risks and others not.  Yet this is precisely our task.  Beck is 
mistaken in attributing the West's (shifting) response to modern technological hazards 
to the overcoming of material needs.  It is not technology itself which people worry 
about but how society is organised, what its impacts are on the individual, where 
power lies and how it is managed, as well as the impact of individuals on society.  
Hence the emphasis on communism rather than nuclear weapons and the dissipation 
of nuclear protest once communist regimes collapsed.   
 
Amongst Indians the central risk perceived as such is not a consequence of the 
'dictatorship of scarcity', as Beck rather glibly suggests, but a concern for social status 
and maintaining social order.  The latter is thought best achieved by establishing 
stable families in which men have the main resources, rights and responsibilities  
which must be protected from women except in circumstances that better serve the 
goal of maintaining stable families.  And, indeed, engaging in discourses which argue 
in terms of maintaining social order is more likely to secure legal or policy changes 
that benefit women than arguing in terms of women's rights.   
 
What we need to be examining is the way the concept of risk is imbricated in politics; 
the way dominant definitions of risk set moral codes which frame disciplinary 
regimes, constrain action and set the terms of debate in which people engage both to 
enforce and resist the impact of such definitions.  Such an approach prevents us from 
assuming, rather than investigating, the impact of poverty on risk perception.  It 
reveals that even for those living on very low incomes the primary concern may be 
risks to social status and to the security ordered social relations seem to offer.  In 
Chennai's low-income settlements it is precisely through this lens that economic need 
is refracted.    
 
Dominant perceptions of risk are collective nightmares.  On the one hand they are 
rooted in a failure of the imagination, a failure to envisage alternatives.  On the other 
they are rooted in an over-stimulated imagination which can see no boundaries to 
change.  In both they reflect, and sometimes illuminate, the sources and centres of 
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(1) At Kyoto America refused to commit to stabilisation of domestic gas emissions 
and rejected a strong compliance regime for emission targets.  Instead it demanded 
unlimited emissions trading, backdating of emissions quotas and no joint buyer/seller 
liability for fraudulent trading.  These demands would allow America to buy other 
countries' emission quotas, as well as the estimated emissions Russia did not produce 
over the last decade (due to economic crisis) and would encourage fraudulent trading.  
If met America's demands would raise global emissions as well as increase its own 
emissions (Climate Action Network, 1997).   
 
(2) In the opinion of the United Kingdom's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND) the declared nuclear powers have no intention of banning nuclear weapons 
despite their rhetoric to the contrary.  The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which 
only required the declared nuclear powers to start talking (within a period of twenty 
years) about the possibility of a global ban on nuclear weapons, was extended 
indefinitely in 1995 at their insistence.  While obsolete weapons have been destroyed 
to much fanfare, the nuclear powers are updating their nuclear arms as well as 
developing and building new ones such as the 'bunker busting bombs' designed to 
combat the kind of strategies Saddam Hussein employs.  CND considers that the 
dissipation of popular opposition to the stockpiling of nuclear arms and the 
fragmentation of active resistance is directly connected to the fall of communism 
(personal communication, 1998).  
 
(3) For more detailed accounts of regional and class-based variations in how women 
were re-imagined during the colonial period see Sangari and Vaid (1989). 
  
(4) For a discussion of custodial rape cases see Nair (1996). 
 
(5) An explicit expression of this is the belief that marriage is the best means of 
steering a wayward son back onto the 'right path'. 
 
(6) The term drunkard is the one women use to describe husbands who drink heavily 
('a full time drunkard').  It reflects the way the urban poor consume alcohol, solely to 
get drunk.  No enjoyment is expected of the flavour: alcohol is downed in one go with 
eyes screwed up as though submitting to foul-tasting medicine.  
    
(7) In Chennai English words are borrowed although the meaning may be altered.  A 
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